Editors’ welcome

Hello! And welcome to issue 3 of the Queen Mary History Journal for 2013-14. This months edition is focused upon the theme ‘East and West’, and we have a wide range of topics for your reading pleasure, ranging from the Crusades to the 9/11 attacks in New York to the developments of political thought in Russia. Fun for the whole family I’m sure you would agree.

We received the highest number of essay submissions so far this month, and everyone on the Journal team is thrilled with the ever-increasing participation of Queen Mary’s glorious history students. Whilst this unfortunately means that we have had to turn down a number of great essays, do not despair! You will have plenty of opportunities to showcase your talents in upcoming editions, and we urge you to continue submitting.

Coming up after the Christmas break is our first printed edition of the Journal this year, as well as another themed online edition, this time looking at ‘Gender’, so get sending in your essays to be considered for both of these. Additionally, we are always accepting blog posts, based on anything you like that is related to history, so be sure to send those in too! Whilst on the topic of the online edition and blog, our website is very close to being up and running and we hope to have all past and future editions published on there for the world to see very soon.

As always, all essay submissions and blog posts should be sent to qmulhistoryjournal@outlook.com to be considered for publication, don’t miss your chance to be featured in the first print edition of this year, and we look forward to reading your essays and seeing you at the event.

Have a very merry Christmas,

Sam Winton and Ruth Irwin

Editor-in-Chief and Commissioning-editor
The Path of Anguish: What were the main long-term historical causes of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks?

Michael Zamecnik

‘We love death. The U.S. loves life. That is the big difference between us.’

- Osama bin Laden, October 2001

The morning of Tuesday, September 11th 2001 was temperate and practically cloudless over the eastern seaboard of the United States. Thousands of workers made their way into the vast complex of the World Trade Centre in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. At 8:46 am, people in the streets of Lower Manhattan looked up in bewilderment as a jet airliner, hijacked by members of the Islamic terrorist organisation Al Qaeda, roared over their heads and crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre. Loaded with over 10,000 gallons of kerosene it exploded in a massive fireball instantly killing hundreds of civilians as well as trapping further hundreds in the floors above the impact zone. Only moments later, at 9:03am, the South Tower was also hit by a terrorist-hijacked airliner. For nearly two hours, the World Trade Centre buildings burned before collapsing in a ten-second wave of total destruction. Meanwhile, at 9:37am, the Pentagon in Washington D.C. was also struck by a hijacked aircraft, while the fourth hijacked plane, likely intending to target another major building in the capital, crashed in rural
Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to regain control over the hijackers.³

In total, the September 11th attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. claimed the lives of 2,996 people, left thousands injured and caused hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of damage, more than any foreign attack in American history.⁴ Besides these human and material losses, the attacks delivered a historically unprecedented blow to the American nation and threatened their sense of security little over a decade following the end of the Cold War. The wake of these attacks witnessed a series of equally unprecedented changes in domestic legislation and the adoption of a pre-emptive, unilateralist foreign policy, which in turn affected many vestiges of American society, culture and values. Many of these effects are still powerfully felt within the United States and continue to bring violent fallout in many regions of the world. However, in the light of such significant and historical changes, what were the main long-term historical causes responsible for the September 11th attacks?

In order to approach this question, it is necessary to analyse and evaluate the multitude of historical factors that can be attributed to the September 11th 2001 attacks. They will be organised into two main and significantly interlinked groups, examining a set of internal and external factors, respectively, within the analysis. The first group will discuss the long-term historical internal factors, reaching back to the first half of the twentieth century and the troubled development of modern Arab states under the auspices of Cold War rivalry, together with the rise of radical, political Islam. The second group will focus on the various external factors which can be argued to have aided the development of radical Islamic terrorism, including American involvement in the Middle East and support for Israel, the radicalising ‘crucible’ of the Afghan War of 1979-89, and lastly, the First Iraq War of 1990-91. These factors will be evaluated alongside primary sources, producing a conclusion as to the main long-term historical causes responsible for the September 11th terrorist attacks.

During the weeks and months following September 11th, commentators from across the globe declared that the terrorist attacks marked a ‘turning point’ in history. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were of such scale, magnitude and significance that they could be only compared to events of such precedence as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 or the end of the Cold War.⁵ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the world’s sole remaining superpower, gaining a unique level of global reach and unilateral freedom of action unlike any other world power in human history.⁶ The sheer facticity of American supremacy is impressive enough in its own right, but what the 9/11 attacks made clear was that the United States did not wield merely historically unprecedented power, but also extraordinary symbolic significance through its military, economic and cultural influence.⁷
and the Pentagon represented not only American economic and military dominance, but also effectively emphasised the global economic, military and cultural ascendancy of the West. Thus, Al Qaeda’s attack on these symbols struck at the heart of global western power and authority.  

To consider the long-term internal factors, the analysis leads back to the first half of the twentieth century, which saw the advent of modern Arab nation states and the rise of political Islam. In particular, the advent of the nation state in combination with the growth of radical Islam has been argued to be of predominant importance in framing conflict and radicalism in Muslim world. Nationalism was a ‘Western’ import and was one of the modernising forces that were a source of both development and conflict in the Middle East. After decades of European colonialism, the newly independent Arab nations borrowed institutions and practices largely from the West, including the continued use of Western languages, legal and educational systems, as well as trading and commercial institutions. This was mainly done in order to compete and thrive in a world where they began to play important strategic and economic roles, particularly as the newly established Arab states became increasingly politically important in the nascent Cold War. Historian Richard Crockatt has argued that it was these, external pressures of the world, as much as the internal needs of Arab states, which dictated the forces of modernisation.

However, rapid modernisation and superpower political haranguing within Arab secular governments led to an increasingly significant alienation of their populations, many of which turned towards the movements of the growing Islamic revival. Out of the many movements that grew in prominence during the first half of the twentieth century, the most significant were the Egyptian-originating Muslim Brotherhood and the Pakistani Jamaat-I-Islami. Both movements rejected the modernising trends in Muslim countries and became increasingly theologically and politically radical, arguing for societal changes that discarded either Western capitalist society or Soviet communism. In particular, the writings of Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) of the Muslim Brotherhood became very prominent, as Qutb powerfully mixed Islamic scholarship with an overwhelming resentment of Western society and history. Most notably in his essay ‘The America I Have Seen’, Qutb denounced the United States as an inherently militaristic, primitive and decadent society, describing Americans as ‘a warrior who loves combat (...) the idea of combat and war runs strong in his blood (...) primitive in his artistic tastes (...) a nation devoid of virtue’. These writings of Qutb present a fascinating insight into his understanding and his strong opposition towards the United States and Western culture as a whole, which was subsequently adopted by many of his followers. Despite being often brutally suppressed by the Middle Eastern regimes, relying on either American or Soviet support throughout the Cold War, political and economic instability gave these radical views new relevance. Internally, the importance of oil for many Middle Eastern countries and their economies became a major issue. Though oil was not distributed evenly throughout the region, the
geopolitical significance ensured that the political alignments of all nations were matters of extreme sensitivity for both the superpowers and the governments in the Middle East, shaped through the use of both soft power and military violence.\textsuperscript{15} In many states, such as Iraq, Iran or Saudi Arabia, the influx of wealth due to the burgeoning oil industry spurred rapid development of infrastructure, urbanisation and general modernisation during the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly as a result of the 1970s energy crisis.

However, the rapidity of these developments caused the decay of traditional social structures, and left many Arab economies dependent on the oil industry as a primary source of revenue, rendering them extremely vulnerable to shifts in oil prices. By the mid-1980s, oil revenues diminished dramatically in the light of the so-called ‘1980s oil glut’ and coinciding with a general economic stagnancy, this resulted in a growing population of discontented, relatively well-educated young men without any prospect of a suitable, steady employment.\textsuperscript{16} By the 1990s, these social groups became vulnerable to widespread radical ideologies in their heavily strained societies, which suffered from widespread poverty, extreme economic inequality, the prevalence of government by autocratic rulers often supported by major powers such as the US, and the inability to keep pace with emerging economies in an increasingly globalised world.\textsuperscript{17}

For many Muslim radicals, these economic models, often imposed on Arab states by foreign Western or Soviet influence, failed in the Middle East, and a move towards re-Islamization, together with a desire to return back to the values and traditions of a supposed ‘golden age’ in Islamic history, was seen as the solution.\textsuperscript{18} Interestingly, while this preoccupation with an idealised image of the past appears to be a recurring theme among many other fundamentalist, anti-western radical ideologies, such as the short-lived Marxist-nationalist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during the 1970s, it was within the frustrated populations of Arab societies where Qutbism, Salafism and other similar radical Islamist ideologies found lasting fertile grounds. In this respect, Osama bin Laden’s statements and actions throughout the 1990s present a consistent and good example of the Salafist extreme rejection of both the West, and of Arab governments which would closely cooperate with Western powers, such as Saudi Arabia, which bin Laden personally accused of betraying true Islam.\textsuperscript{19} Nevertheless, these sentiments were further exploited by various external factors, resulting in radicalisation, which led to the rise of militancy and ultimately, acts of terror.

One of the most significant external historical factors, which led to the spread of hatred and radicalisation among the Middle Eastern countries towards the West and the United States, was the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The establishment of Israel in May 1948 led to the development of a major fault line in Middle Eastern affairs, together with a politically corrosive refugee problem. The succession of conflicts between Israel and several Arab states, taking place in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982, all deepened the chasm between Israel and its neighbours, while also exacerbating the Palestinian problem. During these several conflicts, Israel was continuously supported by significant amounts of US military, financial and
technological aid, creating a source of powerful resentment in the increasingly radicalised Arab world. Within numerous Salafist writings, as historian Michael Doran argues, ‘the United States emerges as the senior member of a ‘Zionist-Crusader alliance’, dedicated to subjugating Muslims, and most importantly, destroying Islam.’\textsuperscript{20} The resultant extremist logic of the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation suggests Israel as the prime instrument of American and Western ‘imperialism’ in the Middle East and hence the predominant reason and justification for \textit{jihad}. This stance can be further illustrated by numerous statements produced by senior lieutenants of the \textit{Al Qaeda} organisation, including Osama bin Laden’s statements in his open letter to the United States from 2002, claiming ‘The creation and continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the leaders of its criminals (...) the American people are the ones who pay the taxes which fund the tanks that strike and destroy our homes in Palestine (...) tax dollars are given to Israel for it to continue to attack us.’\textsuperscript{21} In this respect, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can thus be considered to be one of the key external long-term causes for the series of terrorist attacks that \textit{Al Qaeda} orchestrated on US territory and abroad.\textsuperscript{22} Historian Richard Crockatt concludes that while ‘there is no guarantee that (...) September 11\textsuperscript{th} would not happen if the Palestinian-Israeli issue did not exist, (...) its resolution would materially reduce the pretexts for terrorism.’\textsuperscript{23} However, it is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that can be viewed as the ‘crucible’ in the intrinsic collection of long-term external factors, which motivated the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks.\textsuperscript{24} For most of the twentieth century, Afghanistan remained relatively remote from the attention of the West, until a communist, pro-soviet coup took over power in 1978. Concerned with mounting political instability and opposition to the regime, the USSR intervened by invading Afghanistan in December 1979, causing a civil war to break out.\textsuperscript{25} In a decisive response, the US Carter administration publicly denounced the invasion and initiated the covert organisation of aid, including arms and military support, to the Afghan Mujahedeen in their resistance to Soviet occupation.\textsuperscript{26} This support dramatically expanded under the Reagan administration, when the CIA, in considerable cooperation with the Pakistani \textit{Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)}, initiated the recruitment and extensive funding of radical Muslims from around the world to gain military training in Pakistan and fight with the Mujahedeen as a form of religious ‘mercenaries.’\textsuperscript{27} Given the conditions of the Islamic world at the time, the call to \textit{jihad} led to the widespread mobilisation of thousands of radical young Muslims, who resented the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but also often resented the United States and its policies within the Middle East in equal measure.\textsuperscript{28}

As a result, radical Islamic networks spread across the entire world, reaching Chechnya, Kosovo, Egypt and even Indonesia. The \textit{Foreign Affairs} journal estimates, over 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40 Islamic countries joined the Afghan conflict between 1982 and 1992.\textsuperscript{29} Tens of thousands more came to study in Pakistani Madrasahs, traditional theological schools, where they were taught radical Islamist ideologies. Eventually more than 100,000 foreign Muslim radicals were directly
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influenced by the Afghan jihad.\textsuperscript{30} A primary source account of the Afghan War reflects, that the bloodied veterans of the conflict ‘...have grown in darkness amidst death. They are angry and ignorant, and hate all things that bring joy to life.’\textsuperscript{31} While this account may appear grotesquely dark, it is not far from describing one of the major heritages of the Afghan conflict, which was the radicalisation and brutalisation of thousands of Muslim men, who acquired military skills and an extremely radical Islamic worldview by partaking in the conflict. Following the end of the war, these radicalised men, including the newly formed Al Qaeda group, spilled into the world, extending their war against the USSR into a form of a ‘perpetual jihad’ against an alien Western culture and civilisation. Therefore, the Afghan-Soviet War raging during the 1980s became the key radicalising point in the development of highly organised Islamic terrorist groups and networks, which were to serve as a springboard for the attacks against the United States in the 1990s and 2000s.

Finally, the first Iraq War of 1990-91 arguably presents the last major long-term factor that preceded Al Qaeda’s attacks against the United States. The war and the wide-ranging American involvement within this conflict can be argued as responsible for the radicalisation and motivations of the newly formed Al Qaeda organisation to start planning and executing attacks on the United States, domestically and abroad. Following the end of the Gulf War in February 1991, the US continued to be involved in the region, where they conducted periodic bombing raids and imposed severe economic sanctions on Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein’s resistance in complying with UN resolutions.\textsuperscript{32}

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It is argued that these sanctions resulted in the deaths of more than 1.2 million Iraqi civilians, including – as according to the UNICEF estimates from 1999 – over half a million of children under the age of five.\textsuperscript{33} The US also retained a large military presence in Saudi Arabia and a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. In this respect, the decade following the end of the Gulf War witnessed the largest single American military commitment since the Vietnam War, and brought the US even closer to the regional balance of power.\textsuperscript{34} As witnessed in bin Laden’s statements, the sanctions of the US against Iraq, in combination with their military presence in Saudi Arabia, the location of Islam’s holiest sites of Mecca and Medina, were interpreted and resented as yet another form of Western involvement within Middle Eastern affairs, as well as a direct attack against Islam.\textsuperscript{35}

In conclusion, the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks on the United States were caused by a combination of both long-term and short-term factors of varying origin, which will continue to inspire scholarly debate. Indeed, the issue of terrorism itself presents a multifaceted area of study, for which the school of History alone cannot serve a sufficient answer. The long-term historical causes, forged by decades of historical internal issues and perceived grievances against the West, were lethally tempered in the brutalising furnace of the Soviet-Afghan War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Gulf War. Thus, these long-term internal and external pressures gave the necessary impetus for the brandishing of a terrifying form of international, multifaceted terrorism, with the clear aims, funding and motivation to perpetrate
acts of mass murder, which ultimately culminated in the tragedy that unfolded on Lower Manhattan in the morning hours of September 11th.

Notes

7. Ibid., p. 3.
10. Ibid., p. 80.
11. Ibid.
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Notes

31. Ibid., p. 56.
34. Richard Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order, p. 98.

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Michael Zamecnik What were the main long-term historical causes of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks?
The evidence recorded by the eyewitnesses to the First Crusade proves that the participants were driven by an unbreakable sense of Christian devotion. Discuss.

Elizabeth Barnes

When Urban II preached the First Crusade in 1095 in Clermont, he himself could not have predicted the fervour with which Europe would take up the cross and travel to the Holy Land in defence of Christendom, or indeed the successes which they would go on to achieve. Why so many responded to Urban’s call remains a key question, and one which cannot be answered simply. Many factors may have influenced the crusaders, such as the hope for material gain (including the possibility of winning both riches and land), the chance to win earthly glory and of course the hope to repent for sins and gain eternal salvation. The religious aspect of crusading is one which must not be underestimated considering the ubiquity of the Christian faith in Western Europe and very real fears of damnation. People were confronted on a regular basis with the need to repent for sin through acts of penance and pilgrimage; churches contained images of demons and angels, of judgement after the death and the consequences of deviation from the correct way of life as preached by the Church. Crusading as a means of pilgrimage, a way of atoning for the inherent sinful nature of man is thus key, particularly in its appeal to those who spent their lives shedding blood: knights. Eyewitness accounts of the First Crusade give an insight into the mind-set of these people who went to the Holy Land, and in many cases focus on the devotion to Christianity of those involved.

This essay will explore piety as a driving force behind the First Crusade, looking at the three main accounts (those of Raymond of Aguiler, Fulcher of Chatres and the Gesta Francorum) alongside the letters of crusaders themselves. Particular attention will be paid to references to scripture as evidence of the authors’ conviction of and devotion to the Christian faith as the main driving force behind the First Crusade.

The first issue that must be addressed is the problems that are faced when dealing with eyewitness accounts of the First Crusade. Of the three main accounts, two were definitely written by clerics (Raymond and Fulcher) and it is likely that the Gesta Francorum also was, although that the author remains anonymous poses further problems. The three authors followed different leaders, however, with Raymond being chaplain to the count of Toulouse, Fulcher a cleric who travelled with Robert of Normandy and later Baldwin of Boulogne and the author of the Gesta Francorum a follower of Bohemund of Taranto and later a part of the main force to march on Jerusalem. Having three such complete accounts from three different perspectives is undoubtedly highly valuable, with the bias of one often being balanced out by that of the others. All were written after the First Crusade, and the successes of the mission certainly influenced how they recorded it; all also (perhaps inevitably) emphasise the religious aspect of crusading over any other driving forces. Thus, I would agree with Edgington in arguing that, despite the wealth of material available in these accounts, other sources must be looked at in order to gain a fuller picture of the motivations and deeds of the crusaders;
the letters that they wrote to relatives and friends back home allow a level of immediacy which the three main accounts do not provide.¹

The use of scriptural references in the eyewitness accounts indicates the authors’ belief in the idea of the Crusade as being special, as having a certain spiritual element which placed it above the realm of secular warfare; all write that the successes the crusaders achieved were God given, a sign that He condoned the behaviour of the Latins in marching on the Holy Land. As they were writing after the Christians took Jerusalem, it is unsurprising that they held this viewpoint. Just as ‘most medieval Latin Christians were obsessed with sinfulness, contamination and the impending afterlife,’ they also believed that God had a very real impact on their day to day lives; they believed He influenced both destructive events, such as famine and drought, and helped those in need through the miraculous curing of the sick or sending weaker armies victory in combat.² As the crusaders progressed towards Jerusalem, it is not shocking that reports of comets, visions and miracles increased, with the discovery of the Holy Lance in 1098 at Antioch only adding to the religious fervour of the participants.

Many of the Biblical references directly involve this idea of God-given victory, or of the crusaders as the warriors of the Christian faith. In the Gesta Francorum, for example, the author speaks of the crusaders in the company of the Count of Flanders at Antioch as having ‘the armour of true faith.’³ This is taken from Ephesians 6:10-17, in which the concept of spiritual warfare is discussed, particularly the idea of fighting not against ‘flesh and blood’ but against ‘spiritual forces of evil.’⁴ The chapter goes on to describe faith as a shield and the word of God a sword. This is thus, in effect, an exploration of the crusades as being a form of holy war outside of the normal realms of warfare experienced within Europe, and the use of scripture to cement this idea is vital. Without biblical support, it would be difficult to claim that any such war is truly ‘holy’ rather than simply a means of asserting papal authority or expanding European influence into the East.

Later on in the text, when writing about ‘the Suffering of the Crusaders at Antioch,’ the author again references this part of the Bible, in this case quoting Bohemund as saying ‘this battle is not carnal but spiritual.’⁵ This is an explicit reference by Bohemund in regards to the religious nature of the conflict, suggesting that as a leader of crusaders he was motivated by his Christian faith. In the same quote he beseeches each man to become ‘the bravest athlete of Christ,’ referencing a common theme in scripture.⁶ The idea of Christians being ‘athletes’ and completing a ‘race’ is referred to several times in the Bible, notably in Acts 20:24: ‘However, I consider my life worth nothing to me, if only I may finish the race and complete the task the Lord Jesus has given me- the task of testifying to the gospel of God’s grace.’ This again supports the idea of the Crusade as a holy mission, approved of (and encouraged by) God in order to spread His word and punish His enemies; that Bohemund would say this to his men makes it clear that (at least according to this account) he was driven by his devotion to his faith,
rather than any hope for materialistic gain. It is also important to be aware of the context of this reference: the crusaders were under threat simultaneously from famine and from the Muslim armies around them. That such a speech, one which appealed to their faith almost exclusively, would rouse them to the point of victory reveals much about their motives.

The style of the Gesta Francorum is also significant when considering the desire of the author to focus his account of the events of the First Crusade on the sense of devotion amongst the participants. He writes in the style of Paul, frequently stopping mid-narrative to write a prayer or reinforce the need for ‘the favour of our Lord Jesus Christ’ or ‘God’s guidance.’ This serves not only to illustrate his personal belief in the success of the Crusade as being in God’s hands, but also serves as a reminder to the reader of the religious nature of the events; it is likely that the author was keen to highlight the righteous, religious driving factors behind the Crusade rather than draw too much attention to any materialistic motives.

Raymond of Aguiler also quotes from scripture, mainly when he writes of the fall of Jerusalem; he too focuses on the victories of the crusaders as a sign of God’s approval. One reference he makes is to chapter 14 of Revelations, where the story of the judgement of the Earth is told. That this reference is apocalyptic in nature is particularly important, indicating that the victory at Jerusalem was seen by the crusaders as a final victory over the ‘evil’ Muslims. of the Holy City:

So let it suffice to say this much, at least, that in the Temple and porch of Solomon, men rode in blood up to their knees and bridle reins. Indeed, it was a just and splendid judgement of God that this place should be filled with the blood of the unbelievers, since it had suffered so long from their blasphemies. That the crusaders, or at least Raymond, saw this as a religious victory more than a territorial conquest is particularly striking. Raymond later quotes psalm 118:24, again as a means of highlighting the role of God in the victory: ‘this is the day which the Lord hath made, let us rejoice and be glad in it.’ The psalm is triumphant, celebrating the coming of Christ and His gift of salvation to the world, a triumph which the crusaders equate to their victory at Jerusalem, perhaps in the belief that they have realised God’s desire for the supremacy of Christianity.

It is important to note however, that in many cases the brutality that the three main accounts describe goes directly against both Augustinian ideas of Just War and the laws of warfare as laid out in the Old Testament. Fulcher of Chatres records that upon the fall of Jerusalem, ‘neither women nor children were spared,’ which is against Augustine’s teaching to limit violence to the least possible in order to gain victory. In Deuteronomy chapter 20, it is written that when a city is taken ‘put to the sword all the men in it. As for the women, the children, the livestock and everything else in the city, you may take these as plunder for yourselves.’ This
parameters of holy war and that the slaughter carried out was not in accordance with the biblical principles they had been appealing to in order to justify the Crusade. The latter part of Deuteronomy, chapter 20 details exceptions to these rules, naming ‘Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites and Jebusites,’ all peoples from the Middle East, as nations who, when attacked by Christians, should be slaughtered: ‘do not leave anything alive that breathes.’ It is probable that the crusaders took these verses to refer to their Muslim enemies, thus making them exempt from any protection under Just War laws; this would also help to explain the detached manner in which the barbarity of the crusaders’ actions against Muslim people is described.

Whilst the focus of these three accounts is clearly on the religious aspects of the Crusade, examples of materialism amongst the participants can also be clearly seen. The looting that the Gesta Francorum records appears to be more practical than purposeful: the crusaders had to take food from the cities they conquered in order to feed themselves. Even when he writes of the army taking ‘gold and silver, the horses and mules, [...] goods of all kinds,’ it is brief, and the author is quick to return to the subject of the crusaders worshipping at the Holy Sepulchre. Fulcher devotes a chapter to ‘the Spoils Taken By the Christians,’ however, and highlights the desperation of some of the crusaders to get to any riches; many burn the bodies of Muslims who had swallowed coins before the city fell, and Tancred is described thieving from ‘the temple of the Lord most wrongfully,’ although he later returns the goods he stole. It is important to note that such references to looting are rare in the three accounts if compared to the evidence supporting the piety of the participants.

In the letters of the crusaders, evidence of materialism is also scarce. Stephen of Blois, writing to his wife Adele, tells her that of ‘gold, silver and many other kind of riches I now have twice as much as your love had assigned to me when I left you,’ clearly aware that this information will please her. That is his only reference to the riches he has gained, however, with the rest of the letter filled with his accounts of crusader victories and his optimism for the future success of the crusade. His letter is filled with thanks for God for the victories, and he frequently refers to the participants as ‘God’s army’ and ‘under the leadership of Christ.’ Other letters also contain this sense of the participants’ devotion to the religious aspect of the Crusade, with Anselm of Ribemont writing to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims that as the crusaders conquered Nicaea they were carrying crosses and shouting ‘Glory to Thee, O God.’ He does make a passing reference to looting, however it is brief and argued as necessary considering the conditions faced by the crusaders; he states that Antioch ‘is supplied to an incredible extent with grain, wine, oil and all kinds of food,’ rather than any riches or money. He also beseeches the archbishop to pray for the crusaders and ask others to do so for him, something which can be seen in several of the letters, for example from The Patriarch of Jerusalem to the Church in the West and the 1099 letter from Godfrey,
Raymond and Daimbert to the Pope. Whilst it is probable that the authors, particularly of the three main accounts, are exaggerating the religious devotion of the crusaders and thus avoiding extensive commentary on looting, it would be difficult to argue that the First Crusade was one driven by a desire for material gain: as Riley-Smith points out, ‘there is little evidence for them returning home rich in anything but relics.’ The level of devotion expressed in these letters, particularly that of Stephen of Blois to his wife, would be unnecessary to feign, and in many cases it is clear that the men have been swept up in the religious fervour resulting from the successes of the Crusade.

Travelling to the East as a part of the First Crusade was actually a large financial commitment for many involved, as demonstrated by the charter evidence that survives. Before travelling to Jerusalem, many wealthier men donated to abbeys, perhaps in the hope of gaining God’s favour and thus increasing their chances of survival, but maybe they also foresaw that they might not return and so felt the Church was the place for whatever wealth they had. Two brothers, Bernard and Odo, for example, made a donation to Cluny in 1096 before joining the Crusade ‘for the remission of [their] sins.’ Duke Odo of Burgundy donated land to the abbey of Molesme before travelling to Jerusalem ‘fired by divine zeal and love of Christianity.’ In May 1096 in Lérins, Fulk Doon of Châteaurenard donated a lot of property to the abbey; in return he was given a napkin (instead of a pilgrim’s purse), directly linking this concept of donation and the aspect of pilgrimage involved in crusading. This evidence, coupled with the fact that few returned with any spoils, suggests that to argue that the crusaders were driven by materialism is unrealistic; the risks involved and the slim chance of worthwhile physical rewards makes devotion to Christianity again the most obvious driving force. Even the chance for ‘earthly glory,’ fame or renown, which Riley-Smith suggests sent some on the Crusade, would have been slight, and it is doubtful that many would have travelled to the East for this reason alone, particularly during the First Crusade when no precedent had been set and predictions of success would have had little factual basis.

Considering this evidence, not only of accounts written during and after the crusade but also charters detailing the preparations of the participants beforehand, it would be difficult to argue that the majority of crusaders were driven mainly by anything other than their Christian faith. Erdmann’s emphasis of the papacy as the driving force behind the First Crusade fails to consider that many of those who travelled to the East would have been poorly educated, and whether scripture condoned the concept of holy war would have meant little to them, although it undoubtedly meant a lot to the Raymond of Aguiler and the author of the Getca Francorum. Riley-Smith also dismisses this idea of crusading as a movement driven by the papacy, pointing out the lack of visions of St. Peter (and the many visions of other figures); rather he points to the devotion of the participants themselves who believed they were ‘God’s elect, chosen from all
mankind, pre-elected for the task they had undertaken.\textsuperscript{24} Enthusiasm for feast days, relics and pilgrimage grew over the eleventh century, and this ’normal’ pattern of worship resumed after the First Crusade had completed its task by conquering Jerusalem. If the aim had been materialistic, Riley-Smith argues, conquest would have continued, or at the least many would have stayed to settle the land- according to Fulcher, of the company of crusaders he travelled with only 600 men remained to guard Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa.\textsuperscript{25} Whilst in later years, ideas of chivalry and ancestral pride may have sent people to the East, in the eleventh century, as Asbridge argues, ’devotion inspired Europe to crusade.’\textsuperscript{26}

To conclude, despite the brutality of the First Crusade and the vast swathes of territory gained by its participants, it is clear that materialism played little role in driving them towards the East. In the three main accounts, the use of scripture suggests that the authors genuinely believed the expedition to be one not only sanctioned by God, but aided by him. That the majority of crusaders themselves shared this idea is made clear both in the letters sent back to Europe and the growing number of miracles and visions witnessed in the camps, which increased alongside the success of the Crusade. Even before they departed for the Holy Land, their devotion to the religious cause of the First Crusade is made evident by surviving charter evidence, which shows those with land or wealth donating to abbeys, or in some cases leaving relatives in the care of monks or nuns to become novices should the crusader not return.

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Attitudes towards the Muslim enemy, often referred to as ‘evil’ by the accounts, also illustrate the religious motivations behind the Crusade. The likening of the conquest of Jerusalem to judgement day (in Raymond of Aguiler’s account), for example, suggests that the Christian victory is akin to one of good over evil. The way in which the brutality of the crusaders is recorded also suggests that they viewed the Muslims as beneath themselves, almost inhuman, which falls in line with Deuteronomy 20:16-18. Stephen of Blois’ letter serves as evidence of this, in which he writes to his wife that ‘we also carried back to the army more than two hundred of their heads, in order that the people might rejoice on that account.’\textsuperscript{27} Those sources which do mention materialism do so sparingly, and in many cases the looting that they write about seems more pragmatic than greedy. After the starvation the crusaders faced when besieging Antioch, severe enough that they would resort to eating the putrid bodies of their enemies, it is unsurprising that upon entering the city they would raid its food stores. That few returned home with any great riches supports this argument, and serves to prove further that materialistic gain was not the main driving force behind the First Crusade.

Overall, it is clear that most of the crusaders were driven by ’an unbreakable sense of Christian faith.’ Many endured terrible hardships on the way to Jerusalem, and that few simply gave up and returned home is a testament to their loyalty to the cause. Although it may be hard for a modern observer to understand such mindless dedication to what now seems a rather barbaric expedition, religion in
the Middle Ages was far more tangible than it is today, with people believing in and seeing God's involvement in day to day life. Thus, the success of the First Crusade was perceived by Europe as God's support for their cause, and the crusading movement that lasted for the next century was sustained on the basis of this belief.

Notes

4. This, and all other references to the Bible, unless otherwise stated, using the New International Version.
6. Ibid., p. 138
7. Ibid., pp. 151-3, p. 153
9. Ibid., p. 262; quote appears as it would in the King James Version

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Notes

15. Ibid., p.6
16. Anselm of Ribemont writing to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (Antioch, February 1098) from Munro, ‘Letters of the Crusaders,’ pp.2-5, p. 4
17. Ibid., p. 5
18. The Patriarch of Jerusalem to the Church in the West (Antioch, January 1098) from Krey, The First Crusade, pp.142-44 and Godfrey, Raymond and Daimbert to the Pope (Laodicea, September 1099) from Munro, ‘Letter of the Crusaders’, pp. 8-11
21. Ibid., p. 167
23. Ibid., p. 723
26. Ibid., p. 359
27. Asbridge, The Crusades, p.47
28. Stephen, Count of Blois and Chartres, To his Wife Adele (Antioch, March 29 ) from Munro, D.C., 'Letters of the Crusaders', p. 6
What were the ideological underpinnings of British imperialism?

Samantha Soares

The British Empire at its peak covered more than eleven million square miles and ruled over approximately four hundred million subjects which demonstrates why so much research has been dedicated to it.¹ The reasons behind expansion on such a grand scale have been hotly debated by historians, and the question at hand points to ideology as the key to an explanation. The term ‘ideology’ traces back to the eighteenth century, and was used to denote a ‘partisan body of ideas’.² The nod towards ideology in the question will be challenged throughout this essay, as it will be argued that there is little evidence of imperial Britain possessing a distinctively imperialist ideology and as such one must look to worldly context and circumstance to explain expansion. To begin with, themes usually attributed to a cultural ideology behind imperialism such as Edward Said’s Orientalism will be discussed and the extent to which it was used to propel notions of superiority. This will then lead into a debate about religion and how far one might be able to argue that it was used to legitimize rule in already conquered territories, rather than promote imperialism in new ones.

Next, biological divisions and Social Darwinism must be discussed. Racial superiority has been triumphed by many historians as the main underpinning of British imperialism and yet contemporary scholarship on this matter is very limited.
In popular culture, racial superiority did hold significance as once again it was used to validate British rule and savagery in their treatment of indigenous peoples but cannot directly explain why the British chose to expand so much. Traditional economic accounts for imperialism, unlike racial ones, put the onus of expansion on Britain claiming they needed new outlets for surplus capital. Such classical arguments are challenged by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson’s argument citing free trade as a factor. Finally, the argument that an imperial ideology existed will be confronted. The world was in a constant state of flux and so it seems fair to argue that expansion was directed by officials who were reacting to circumstance. There wasn’t an imperialist ideology but rather the British expanded when and if it was necessary.

One cannot debate the ‘ideological underpinnings’ of British imperialism without discussing notions of superiority. Superiority is a multifaceted theme as it covers culture, religion and obviously race. Such a theme is inherently linked to the discussion of Orientalism which has been defined as ‘the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient.’ The familiar argument, that it was through Orientalism that the British were able to go forth and expand their empire, will be challenged. The extent to which Orientalist discourse was derisive will also be debated ultimately to challenge Edward Said’s claim that ‘colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism.’ This is because if the Oriental discourse wasn’t as derogatory as has been suggested, then an educational or civilizing mission would have been rendered moot as there wouldn’t have been a need to address anything. It has been argued that Orientalist descriptions of unconquered lands portray the indigenous peoples through stereotypes and exaggerations of their cultural practices such as human sacrifice or cannibalism in an attempt to justify the British civilizing enterprise. Said has written about the use of violence within such texts towards the ‘primitive and barbaric peoples’ as they ‘mainly understood violence or force best.’ In addition admittedly there are excerpts that note a clear and somewhat obvious distinction between Westerners and Orientals who come from a ‘manifestly different world.’

However, this does not simply translate into an ideology that propels conquests in the face of cultural differences. Many sources acknowledge the military might and technological advancement of the West certainly, but one shouldn’t then automatically jump to the conclusion that British people believed the West then had the ‘right’ to conquer the East. Indeed, it was accepted that the demarcation between the East and the West had been in the making for centuries and yet John Mackenzie has emphasised the existence of Oriental themes in across ‘British music, architecture, design, painting, sculpture, and the theatre’ the sheer breadth of which supports the view that there was a ‘genuine respect for the cultures from which it drew inspiration.’ Alongside this, Robert Irwin has criticised Edward Said’s position stating that most of Oriental scholarship was ‘very far from being monolithically racist or a handmaiden of colonialism.’ Such evidence suggests then that Orientalist discourse thus was not a means through which the British sought to expand their
Empire. Therefore with regard to the underpinnings of British imperialism it seems fair to argue that one cannot look to the theme of cultural differences as sufficient for explaining expansionist policy. There is little evidence supporting the argument that in terms of ideology, empire depended on a belief in cultural and civilizational superiority.

It was mentioned briefly earlier that superiority can be linked to religion, and this shall be explored more thoroughly as despite popular assumptions, there is significant evidence to suggest that British territorial expansion - at least to begin with - had rather little to do with spreading Christianity and so cannot be deemed an ‘ideological underpinning’ of British imperialism. In the seventeenth century, as many of the first British settlers began to develop communities and plantations across the globe, it would be fair to assume that they took with them a somewhat Christian mind-set. Yet Elisabeth Elbourne argues that it was ‘inherently unlikely... that all slavers, sailors, and settlers were fervently “religious”’. In the early stages of empire, Britain’s imperialists came to view Christianity as important though not necessarily for the reasons that one might have assumed. Christianity was significant at the outset of empire in the colonies because it was used as a ‘marker of group identity’. In the West Indies Elbourne has noted that Christianity was the defining religion of the masters and as such many settlers vehemently ‘resisted the efforts of Moravian missionaries to preach Christianity amongst slaves.’

Identity was not the only reason for settlers’ opposing the spread of Christianity in the early period as there was a significant relationship between the law and religion. Non-religious people were unable to make property claims and weren’t even allowed to testify in court. Early modern European Law stated an oath was necessary for testimony to have legal weight and an oath couldn’t be taken by non-religious peoples as they couldn’t swear on the Bible. Religion thus it seems was used to ingrain the differences between peoples, triumph separation and propel notions of superiority but importantly only after conquest. It will be argued that the spreading of religion was not part of an ideology behind expansion as the missionary movement that is so commonly linked with empire did not gain influence until the watershed decade of the 1790s. Only then through the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), the London Missionary Society (1795), and the Anglican Church Missionary Society (1799) did the Protestant missionary movement become a ‘characteristic feature of modern British imperialism.’ Changes in Calvinist theology and the spread of evangelicalism drove the spread of Christianity some considerable years afterwards culminating one might argue in instances such as the Indian Uprising of 1857. Indeed many factors led towards the Uprising and it is just one example of resistance and yet the heavy emphasis on religious freedom from an imposing ruler goes quite some way in depicting the result of missionaries in the colonies as time went on. However, this essay is focussed on the ideology which underpinned British imperialism and territorial expansion was taking place far before the missionary...
movement had developed. With this in mind alongside the fact that it was only once already established within new territories that the British used religion to legitimize their rule it wouldn’t be fitting to deem religion as part of an ideology underpinning imperialism.

Various differences between the occupiers and the occupied have been acknowledged and the existence of these leads to the argument that such dissimilarities reflected measurable biological divisions. The extent to which such ideas permeated society is interesting and it will be argued that racial ideas played a significant part in British imperialism, though this does not mean that it was part of a coherent ideology. The argument from race is a multifaceted one as it played a role in both scholarship and even more significantly in popular culture. Although admittedly ‘scientific racism’ was not really evident until the opening of the nineteenth century, the impact that it had upon rationalizations for imperialism was so vast that attention must be paid. This form of ‘science’ commonly known as Social Darwinism placed Europeans at the top of society, followed by Asians, and then finally by Africans. Contemporary scholarship suggested that non-Europeans were of ‘innately inferior intelligence… civilization building, or technological capacity’ which resulted in British superiority and might illuminate a reason behind imperialistic tendencies. However the extent to which scholarship on this issue related to imperialism has been challenged. Historians such as Daniel Pick lean towards a more domestic approach arguing that ‘discourse may have had as much to do with perceived ‘terrors’, ‘primitiveness’ and fragmentation ‘at home’ as in the colonies. Paul Crook writes that this ‘Darwinised British imperial discourse’ didn’t exist. Texts such as Benjamin Kidd’s Social Evolution which many deem to be the fundamental writings of Social Darwinism fail to place a significant emphasis on imperialism or racial hierarchies. Although one must thus argue that ‘scientific’ racial divisions did not play a large role in scholarship this doesn’t mean that it had no role in the advancement of British imperialism.

One could have come to the conclusion that cultural practices may have been exaggerated in Orientalist discourse and this in turn, coupled with ‘scientific’ racial superiority, could provide both explanation and justification for the nature of British conquest and rule. Racial ideas have a vital place as through popular culture they lend themselves to ‘violence, repression and atrocity.’ The existence of racial arguments in popular culture is key as through them the British were able to dehumanise their opponents, which would inevitably result in the justification of merciless territorial advances and extension of British rule in foreign lands. Richard Gott has written that Britain’s empire ‘was established and maintained for more than two centuries, through bloodshed, violence, brutality, conquest and war.’ Racial distinctions at the turn of the century thus can be seen as paving the way for more extensive and brutal acts. James Grant has cited many slaughters carried out by British imperialists where ‘racial characteristics of the enemy are invoked to explain imperial troops’ savagery.’ Although the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 occurred some
years prior to the early years of the twentieth century it can provide an insight into British actions propelled by the belief in biological differences. Michael Lieven argues that the British carried out a ‘policy of refusing to take prisoners and massacring the wounded; towards the end of the war they [the Zulus] were only saved from a policy of genocide by the capture of the Zulu king.’ Such pseudoscience was powerful when intertwined with popular culture, as it provided the British imperialists with a means of validating conquest whenever necessary without having to face questions of morality. The methods that they were employing were justified by the innate ‘animalistic’ nature of their opponents. One might then argue that ‘scientific’ racial divisions aided in the ruling of colonies, but not necessarily in advancing British imperialism.

Pseudoscience provided imperialists with a quantifiable hierarchy that could justify their presence abroad without having to rely on domestic validations. This links to economic accounts for imperialism, as classical theorists argue the very opposite, that the ‘main explanation of imperialism lay in the metropole.’ This metropolitan view that the motherland’s economic situation relied on expelling surplus money will be challenged by Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher’s work which triumphs the notion of an ‘imperialism of free trade.’ Before this is explored, one might note that colonial reformers such as Edward Gibbon Wakefield ‘thought colonies were essential outlets for surplus capital, goods, and population.’ Building on this, it seems fitting to discuss the positions of what are commonly referred to as the ‘classical theorists’ writing around the twentieth century. A.J. Hobson has argued that imperialism was the form that capitalism took ‘chiefly serving the interests of certain classes (investors, financiers).’ J.A. Shumpeter alongside this suggests that capitalism ‘was not inherently imperialistic’ but it could turn into such if influenced by ‘non-economic forces.’ I. Lenin clashes with these historians by stating that imperialism was an inevitable phase ‘in the evolution of capitalism.’ All agree that imperialism transformed in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, but most importantly of all they believed that imperialism could be explained through the metropole. Robinson and Gallagher challenge this metropolitan argument with the idea of ‘a mid-Victorian imperialism of free trade’ manifested through ‘informal empire.’ Across Europe there was a decisive shift from formal to informal rule. Informal rule was characterised by peaceful agreements in place of war. Economics are still deemed important but here imperialism is defined as ‘integrating new regions into the expanding economy.’ One might argue thus that imperialism was driven by free trade and was manifested in informal empire. The wish for free trade therefore can be named as an ideological underpinning of British imperialism.

Throughout this discussion there has emerged the line of argument that although specific themes may have impacted expansionist policy, there is very little evidence suggesting that there was ‘any significant or elaborated imperialist ideology.’ When one attempts to fully explain something as vast and multifaceted
as the British empire through a single ideology, one is undoubtedly going to face problems. This view is supported by John Darwin, who has written that the British Empire was not motivated by a ‘master ideology’ and that their motives were often contradictory. Very few widely-read British manifestos justifying territorial expansion were published, although one must acknowledge the existence of Sir John Seeley’s The Expansion of England. The authorship of such documents is important, as very few were written by men who exercised real power when it came to policy.

The sweeping ideologies of empire that were popular with contemporaries more than likely were ‘marginal in their influence, or were ex post facto rationalizations for acts of expansion typically driven by crisis on the periphery, opportunism, or by a new means of control, rather than by any particular body of ideas.’

Building on the search for free trade, Gallagher and Robinson’s argument that the policy of informal empire was the preferred mode of expansion is enlightening. This is because it seems highly logical that although racial superiority and economic interests were important to the British, direct annexation would’ve come at a high price and so was only really driven by ‘a policy making elite: the famous official mind.’ Informal empire was much simpler and relied on collaboration for the most part and the ‘nature of these bargains determined the character, and the longevity, of colonial rule.’

Nicholas Thomas has written that colonialism ‘is not best understood primarily as a political or economic relationship that is legitimized or justified through ideologies of racism or progress’ and on this one might be inclined to agree with him. It is feasible to suggest that there was no distinct ideology that drove imperialism, instead it was force of circumstance.

The role that ideology played with regard to the advancement of British colonial tendencies has been discussed and one would be justified in concluding that it was not driving British imperialism. Systems of thought such as Said’s Orientalism, and the wish to spread Christianity across the globe fail to provide one with enough evidence to suggest they propelled expansion. This is not to say that they did not play any role in imperialism but rather that they may be better defined as rationalizations after the fact. Admittedly Social Darwinism was not extensively discussed amongst contemporary scholarship and yet its place in popular culture is important as through ‘scientific’ racial divisions the British were able to justify any particularly gory episodes should they need to. The animalistic qualities assigned to non-European races is significant and could easily be deemed an underlying factor which afforded the British longevity in rule abroad. However despite this, all the aforementioned themes fail to portray the reasons behind imperialism. Gallagher and Robinson’s appeal to free trade and the notion of informal empire at last seem to be much more helpful.

By moving away from traditionalist arguments about economics driving expansion they are able to clarify what might have been behind British empire. Semmel has argued that the ‘chief objective of British imperialism was to make trade secure’ thus refuting the ingrained argument that Britain was in desperate need of
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new outlets for goods and capital.\textsuperscript{39} It is more than likely that direct annexation, despite all the later justifications, was more of a hassle than a help and so through informal empire Great Britain was able to secure free trade without the cost of war. Social, political, and religious validations of imperialism all occur ‘after the fact’ and so one would be justified in looking toward much more straightforward causes for answers. This discussion has shown that ideology does not underpin British imperialism as expansion was driven ultimately by circumstance. Free trade is an important factor, but the policy makers at the head of the country would also look at necessity, the development of new weapons, and lastly opportunity. One therefore might conclude by stating that ideologies are unable to explain the many faces of imperialism and so one must look at the immediate threats that Britain as a world power faced which will reveal the reactionary nature of empire. Through exploring these threats the reasons why the British felt the need to exert their power and influence through territorial expansion will become clear.

Notes
2. Ibid., p. 157.
4. Ibid., p. 39.
6. Ibid., p. 3.
Notes

26. Ibid., p. 105.
27. Ibid., p. 105.
34. Stockwell, The British Empire, p. 164.
35. Ibid., p. 164.
36. Ibid., p. 165.

Bibliography

Books

Articles
Discuss the impact of the Westernizer-Slavophile controversy upon the subsequent development of social and political thought in Russia.

Abigail Hayton

The Westernizer-Slavophile controversy was a phenomenon primarily of the 1840s. It was essentially a series of polemics between the Westernizers, who wanted Russia to develop along Western lines and the Slavophiles, who stressed Russia’s particular unique national characteristics. This controversy came to an end following the accession of the so-called “Tsar Liberator”\(^1\), Alexander II in 1855, however, its legacy continued up to and following the Revolution in a wide range of ideologies such as Pan-Slavism, Populism, Liberalism, Gentry Liberalism, Anarchism and Russian Symbolism. However, The key impact of the Westernizer-Slavophile controversy was that it caused an intellectual awakening in Russia, which stimulated a sense of public duty amongst the intelligentsia. These debates initiated an era of ‘Big Ideas’ in Russia, which lasts up until the turn of the century. The resultant movements are in most cases, influenced by both Westernism and Slavophilism, which is emblematic of the ambiguous and often shifting nature of these worldviews, and the manner in which they came into being.

The original controversy began with the first of Pyotr Chaadaev’s *Philosophical Letters* in 1836, which harshly criticised Russia and contrasted it unfavourably with the Western world, a world he believed Russia should imitate.\(^2\) He expressed such sentiments in dramatic language, stating that,
“Not one useful thought has sprouted in the sterile soil of our country”. The Slavophiles were those who responded defensively to Chaadaev’s attacks. They argued, that far from being inferior to the West, Russia was privileged to be uncorrupted by Western rationalism. The first major exponent of this viewpoint within the Westernizer-Slavophile controversy was Kireevski, who wrote in 1845 that Russia “did not become bemused by the one sidedness of syllogistic constructions but constantly adhered to that fullness and wholeness of outlook which constituted the distinctive feature of Christian philosophy.” The Slavophile ideology had its roots in Eastern Orthodox Christianity, which they believed was the one true church. Portrayed as such, one could see the Westernizers as Enlightened thinkers and the Slavophiles as Romantics. However, the complex components of both ideologies are not sufficiently explained by such simplistic interpretations.

The diverse array of movements, which sprang from both Westernizer and Slavophile thought, provide evidence of how varied both worldviews were in themselves. The reason for this diversity, according to Daniel Fielding is that it took a long time for a dividing line to be drawn between Westernizers and Slavophiles, and even when it existed it did not demarcate between left and right. One cannot, in fact, understand the context of these debates of the 1840s without first looking to the 1830s, in which we see further complications in drawing the dividing line between Westernizers and Slavophiles, with regards their respective intellectual biographies. Leonard Schapiro locates the intellectual origins of Slavophilism in the Stankevich circle, the literary and philosophical circle surrounding poet and philosopher, Nikolai Stankevich. Stankevich himself, was a rationalist who attacked all nationalisms, going as far as to say that “to invent or think up a character for a nation out of its old customs, its ancient activities is to wish to prolong for it the period of its childhood”. These were the views of even the most extreme future Slavophiles in the 1830s. With such diverse ideological origins, the long-term implications of Slavophile ideology would inevitably be different from the original Slavophilism, the precise definition of which is quite elusive.

As previously mentioned, the Slavophile ideology, as far as it can be called an ideology, was rooted in Eastern Orthodox Christianity. One could trace Russia’s separation from Western Europe to the mutual excommunications of the Eastern and Western churches in 1054. The key concepts of their Christianity were ‘sobornost’ and ‘samobytnost’, which loosely translated mean unity and individuality, respectively. “Samobytnost”, was understood to be a kind of national cultural autonomy, which was unmoved by outside influences, whereas “sobornost”, could be understood as a religious community, a unity which came from shared Eastern Orthodox beliefs and practices. The combination of these two features, was what they felt distinguished them from the Protestant and Catholic churches of the West. The Catholics being united, but not free and the Protestants being free, but not united. Ironically, however, the Holy Synod did not allow Khomyakov, the key exponent of these ideas, to publish them in Russia, because
they were deemed to be dangerously anti-institutional and anti-authoritarian. The implications of these religious ideas are to be found in the Russian Symbolist movement, which rose to prominence at the turn of the century and the secular Populist movement of the 1870s. The Westernizer-Slavophile controversy brought both a socially conscious and philosophical way of thinking into the heart of the Russian intelligentsia, though this way of thinking clearly manifested itself in different guises.

One could therefore think, that the Slavophiles were religious and the Westernizers, secular. Though this may be true on some level in that the Westernizers did not base their ideas in religious teachings, they too, included religious thinkers. The original Westernizer, Chaadaev, was a deeply religious man, however, unlike the Slavophiles, he was a Catholic. This gave him an automatic connection with Western Europe. He believed that it was Russia’s unique religion, which had fatally removed it linguistically and culturally from Western European civilisation.

A clear point of difference between Westernizers and Slavophiles are their views of Peter the Great. Whereas the Westernizers deeply admired him, the Slavophiles saw him as a sort of national traitor. Chaadaev described Peter I as “The greatest of our kings, our glory, our demigod, who began a new era for us.” Conversely, K.S. Aksakov, a Slavophile writer, accused him of attempting to destroy, “every manifestation of Russian life, everything Russian.”

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Westernizer-Slavophile controversy

This could lead one to believe that the Slavophiles were reactionary in contrast with the progressive Westernizers, however, that too, would not be a fair assessment, as has already been demonstrated, the religious beliefs of the Slavophiles had revolutionary potential, which would later be actualised.

The similarities between Westernizers and Slavophiles can be explained by their shared social and intellectual backgrounds. Their arguments emerged in discussions, which took place in the literary salons of Moscow. The character they took on was almost dialectical, with individuals from both sides periodically agreeing with their so-called opponents. This goes further to explain how ideologies such as Russian Populism or even, Pan-Slavism were inspired both by Westernizers and Slavophiles, in the intellectual awakening which was caused by the controversy.

A key figure in the development of both Westernizer and Slavophile ideology is Alexander Herzen. He started out as a Westernizer, but his travels in Europe post 1847 caused him to question his previous idealisation of Western thought. He came to adopt a position similar to Slavophilism, a synthesis of sorts. He started to see the instinctive Socialism of the Russian peasantry, laying the intellectual groundwork for what would become the Populist movement. Herzen is sometimes presented as a convert to Slavophilism, though given that he was always an atheist and an admirer of Peter I, this is not an accurate description.

A controversy, which was foundational within the wider Westernizer-Slavophile controversy, was that over the history of the peasant
commune. In Slavophile thinking, this institution was sacrosanct. They viewed the Mir as the embodiment of the peasantry’s distinctive Russian character. However, for the Westernizers, such as Chicherin who first raised the issue in the Westernizer journal, Russian Messenger, the commune was a product of government centralisation in the 16th century, which sought to simplify the collection of taxes. In a similar vein to the debate about Peter the Great, these historical controversies are vital in clarifying the ideological boundaries between Slavophiles and Westernizers. The relevance of this discussion is highlighted by the Populist attempts to “go to the people”, based on an understanding of peasant life which owed a lot to Slavophile ideology.

A notion, which runs through Westernizer thought, which partly plays into the Slavophile Weltenschauung, is that of Russia’s skipping the bourgeois-capitalist stage of development, which Marxist philosophy would suggest was essential. This idea was initially developed by Chaadaev in his Apology of a Madmen, where he tries to stress the advantages of Russia’s “lack of History”, which he so derided in his Philosophical Letters. His argument is that Russia was a “tabula rasa”, which could absorb the lessons of the West, without having to experience it first-hand. In Walicki’s view, this position was taken up in order to make Chaadaev’s Westernism more palatable to nationalists. Herzen later developed this reasoning, following his disillusionment with the West. It was this perspective, which motivated the Populists to try and create a uniquely Russian Socialism based on the peasants and their supposedly instinctively socialist institutions. In explaining, this doctrine, which became foundational to Populism, Mikhailovsky wrote, “We must thank fate that we have not lived the life of Europe. It’s misfortunes and its hopeless situation are a lesson for us.” Mikhailovsky turned his back so firmly on the Western ideas, which had influenced him that he deliberately chose not to follow what was by then the classical radical pattern of leaving Russia and directing activity from abroad.

Here we have a clear example of a way of thinking about Russia’s future, which can be traced from the early years of the controversy, through to the Populists of the 1870s and 1880s.

The Populists derived much of their ideology from Westernism. They attempted to create a Socialism, which was uniquely Russian without being backward looking. However, they also imbibed much of Slavophile ideology. Janko Lavrin has gone as to call Narodnichestvo, the key idea behind Populism, “a secularised Slavophism”. However, the extent to which Populism was a secular ideology is disputed. According to G.P. Fedotov, its founders, though not explicitly religious, had “a religious attitude”, which was a product of their upbringings and which meant that subconsciously, Populism was in many ways a religious movement. He cites as evidence for this the numerous examples of Populists such as Catherine Breshko-Breshkovskaya, who underwent religious conversions as well as the ideological similarities between Populism and Slavophilism. The Westernizer-Slavophile controversy laid the groundwork for philosophical and
religious thinking which would later form the foundations of practical political programs.

Slavophilism is also credited with laying the foundations of popular Pan-Slavism. However, this is quite strange as the two ideologies are very different in a number of ways. Firstly, Pan-Slavism was aggressive; it advocated conquest and the formation of an economic and military Slavonic federation under Russian rule, which is at odds with the peaceful nature of Slavophilism. Secondly, whereas Slavophilism was rooted in religious beliefs, Pan-Slavism was primarily a secular worldview. Thirdly, whereas Slavophilism aimed to become a universal value system, Pan-Slavism did not. It advocated a cynical self-serving foreign policy without reference to Christian morality. Therefore, the process by which Slavophilism becomes Pan-Slavism is slow and complex. Andrzej Walicki plots a three-stage process by which the two ideologies amalgamate. The first stage, takes place during the reign of Nicholas I, when Slavophilism could still be characterised by classical Utopian Socialism. The second, during the years 1853-1861, following the Crimean War and the accession of Alexander III, a period known as the “thaw”, which E. Lampert has described as being a moment, “more pregnant with possibilities of development” than any other period from the reign of Peter the Great until Lenin. During the “Thaw”, Walicki argues Pan-Slavism became a widespread ideology, spurred on by the writings of Aksakov. The third period, which completes this transition, takes place in the late 1870s, when Aksakov becomes chairman of the Slavophile Welfare Society, which grew to be an influential force in government. What is shown here is that though Slavophilism may have had specific doctrines as an abstract ideology, most of these were not practically applicable, and therefore, when Slavophilism was translated into a political program, it bore little relation to the original ideology.

In the case of the transition from Slavophilism to Panslavism, we don’t only see a fusion of Slavophile and Western ideas, but also, a weakening of the Slavophile ideology. This was the view of E. Mamonov, who had once been a Slavophile. He saw the second-generation of Slavophilism, which followed the deaths of Aksakov, Khomyakov and Kireevski, as “a trivial, formal and decrepit catechism of clerico-punitve maxims”. Koshelev, another Slavophile author, expressed a different view. For him, the widespread acceptance of Slavophile ideas had brought it into the mainstream, meaning it no longer represented a specific Weltenschauung. His examples of popularised Slavophile ideas are the unity of the Slavic peoples, the study of Russian history and Russian nationalism. This position is well supported, but is very broad, as it would seem to be associating all Russian nationalism with Slavophile thought. Like much of the rhetoric in this era of socio-politico thought, such statements can sound hyperbolic, however, both Koshelev and Mamonov highlight important points about the continuity of Slavophile ideology. Though the influence of much of Slavophile thought lasted until and beyond the turn of the century, it did not survive intact as a singular ideology.
but it served to awaken a sense of political mission amongst Russia’s intelligentsia who interpreted it in a variety of ways.

The Populists are probably the best example of a group who took the intellectual output of the Westernizer-Slavophile controversy and created from it a practical political program, albeit a very unsuccessful one. However, the Populist movement provides a real insight into the intellectual foundations of both Westernizer and Slavophile ideology and the practical adaptability, or lack thereof, of their ideas to 1870s Russian society. The essential idea of these Nardoniki was that a new Socialist society could be founded in Russia from peasant institutions. This would be achieved by sending groups of mainly undergraduate students “into the people”, to create this new society. The problem with this idealistic movement, was that, like its Slavophile predecessor, it was based upon a conception of the peasantry gleaned from books, rather than personal experience and therefore the instinctive socialism, which these intellectuals had attributed to the peasantry turned out not to exist at all. In fact, the peasantry collaborated in the arrests of their would-be saviours. This demonstrates how removed these epigones of both Westernizer and Slavophile ideas were from rural life in Russia, which is unsurprising given that both of these ideologies were developed in Moscow literary salons. They succeeded in providing the intelligentsia with a sense of social responsibility; however, this responsibility was based on unfounded premises about the society that they hoped to transform.

The open-endedness of the debates between Westernizers and Slavophiles provided a diverse range of concepts, which could, in turn, be applied to a variety worldviews. One former Westernizer, Bakunin, adapted both Westernizer and Slavophile ideas to form the first exposition of anarchism as a political philosophy in Russia. He ultimately advocated a Slavic federation, which would be based upon peasant communes, however, not the, Mir, which the Slavophiles had idealised but secular institutions of free association. Bakunin retained an essentially Western idea of freedom and therefore aimed to create this federation without any coercion. Though this ideology is called “anarchism”, it clearly has much in common with Pan-Slavism and Populism. This example shows, that despite the diversity of the world-views, which were influenced by various aspects of the Westernizer-Slavophile controversy, there were a number of particular ideas, which it popularised. These were, as Koshelev said, Slavic unity and Russian nationalism, but in addition to this, the Westernizer-Slavophile controversy awakened a desire among the intelligentsia to be involved with and advocate on behalf of the masses. There is a clear intellectual link between the views of both Westernizers and Slavophiles and later Russian social movements including Socialism.

The Utopian ideas of both Westernizers and Slavophiles would have to be adapted in order to be practically applicable. It is in the attempts to apply these ideas that we see a tremendous diversity and an unprecedented intellectual
creativity. In the Populists, one sees the endurance of Utopian thinking, however, in other contemporary political movements, influenced by Westernizers and Salvophiles, pragmatism was definitely more in evidence than idealism. A key example of this is the Gentry Liberalism of former Slavophiles such as Koshelev and Cherkasky. This liberalism was really a reactionary force, which sought to protect landowners’ power in light of government reforms. Many of these so-called gentry liberals, such as Pavel Miliukov (later Kadet leader) wanted a constitution, however, only one that would be heavily biased toward the gentry. The diversity of views, which come out of the Westernizer-Slavophile controversy give it a power to inspire both rightward and leftward shifts in epigones of both ideologies. The Westernizer-Slavophile dichotomy, as it existed in the 1840s, could not continue following the accession of Alexander II, because many of the key issues it set out, such as the emancipation of the serfs, were resolved.

The impact of the Westernizer-Slavophile controversy on the subsequent development of Social and Political thought in Russia is both broad and deep. The discussions it germinated about Russian culture, nationalism and future development gave rise to a tremendous diversity of ideas. It both stimulated a need amongst the intelligentsia to engage with social and political questions and gave them a framework with which to address these concerns. Following the accession of Alexander II and the end of the political isolation of the intellectual, it was the legacy of the Westernizer-Slavophile controversy, which provided both the ideas and the enthusiasm, which would result in numerous concerted efforts to remake Russian society and politics along a wide range of ideological lines. The controversy initiated a period of “Big Ideas” in Russian intellectual history, founded upon a conviction that the intelligentsia should and could take responsibility for the masses.

Notes

4. Leonard Schapiro, Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, (Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 64-65
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How did British perceptions of Indian culture and society inform colonial education policies during the nineteenth-century?

Joanna Hill

Ideas held by the various British elites – towards the native people of India and their civilization – altered considerably throughout the nineteenth-century. Indian society was perceived as inferior to civilized British society. Educational policy was conducted, by those who administered policy in colonial India, in a ‘Westernised’ way in order to re-inform Indian civilisation. As different elites gained a greater influence over the colonial Indian administration, British educational policy altered in alignment with the dominant perception. Edward Hoebel stated that ‘the process of interaction between two societies by which the culture of the society in subordinate position is drastically modified to conform to the culture of the dominant society’. ¹ Although the course of action taken by British elites altered, in alignment with differing perceptions of Indian culture. This essay suggests that Western education was considered to be superior to Eastern customs and therefore remained at the heart of educational policy throughout the nineteenth-century.

This essay will first discuss how Orientalist ideology moulded the ideas people held towards the East in the early nineteenth-century and how this perception encouraged strategy to ‘know’ Indian society; considering how ‘Anglicist' philosophy
dominated British administration of colonial India and how the idea that Indian civilization was immoral influenced educational policy. Next this essay discusses how 1857 marked a change of administration due to the fear that the British had not ‘known’ Indian society. For the purposes of this essay, ‘uprising’ will be used to articulate the discontentment that was expressed in India during the events of 1857. The uprising encouraged an alteration of perceptions of Indian society and the British government changed educational policy to try and subdue discontentment displayed amongst the Indian people. Finally this essay will discuss how an alternate perception that developed after the uprising; the belief that Indian elites were sufficiently educated, persuaded Allan Hume to encourage Indian elites to govern their own society.

The East India Company directors believed, in order to better direct their affairs in India, that they needed greater knowledge of India and therefore underwent a strategy to ‘know’ Indian civilization. Warren Hastings believed the only way of understanding Indian society was to learn “vernacular” and “classical” of Indian languages. Orientalist ideology dominated policy into the early nineteenth-century. Reports made by the select committee had a scheme in place which traced the meanings of ‘Indian’ words. Charles Wilkins wrote that, when the scheme failed, “it [was] attributable to the want of knowledge, and time, for further research, to supply that deficiency.” This shows that the people directing the affairs of the East India Company wanted to understand classical Indian texts and languages so that they could control territory in the sub-continent, through what they perceived to be the ‘traditional’ ways India had been governed. The governor-generals that directed the policy to ‘know’ India believed that ruling India through the ‘traditional’ modes would prevent a disruption of society and promote peaceful rule. Bernard Cohen argues that “the knowledge of languages was necessary to issue commands, collect taxes, maintain law and order, and to create other forms of knowledge about the people they were ruling.” In addition to this argument the evidence suggests that the way the British elites went about ‘knowing’ India was distinctly Western in its nature; studying texts to understand society.

Western education during the eighteenth-century focused on the study of texts to understand something. The works of Edward Gibbon embody how the British glorified the Roman Empire and followed by their example ‘the period in the history of the world, during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous.’ Gibbon also perceived that “out of the death-throes of the Western Empire were born Europe’s nations, while out of the Eastern Empire’s tardy fall came sparks that lit Europe’s lamps of humanism and science.” This shows that the West not only perceived itself to be superior, because it originated from the Roman Empire, but also that ‘good’ education was based in texts from the Western Empire. Lata Mani argued that ‘officials could insist that brahmanic and Islamic scriptures were prescriptive texts containing rules of social behaviour, even when evidence for this assertion was problematic.’ Mani gives the example of Hastings
because in 1772 he made brahmanic and Islamic texts the basis of personal law, thereby institutionalising his assumption that Indian tradition was also based in text. This suggestion corroborates with contemporary education at Oxford University; at the time, scholars studied Greek and Latin to enable the translation of texts of ancient writers, such as Aristotle. The governors of the East India Company felt they needed to acquire information on India to be able to understand and then administer their affairs there and they learned about Indian culture and society in the only way they knew how to.

The idea that the British needed to ‘know’ India was echoed in Kim written by Rudyard Kipling. Colonel Creighton says to Kim, in relation to boys in the service of the government, that ‘their pay was cut for ignorance. There is no sin so great as ignorance.’ Supporting this Edward Said argues that the British perception of ‘the “good” Orient was invariably a classical period somewhere in a long-gone India, whereas the “bad” Orient lingered in present day Asia.’ They went about ‘knowing’ India in a distinctive western style, by analysing texts and reasoning an outcome.

From ‘knowing’ India, British elites imagined India to be an irrational and misguided society, as it did not follow classical scriptures in order to develop coherent centralized policy. Instead Indian traditions and governance was localised. Warren Hastings perceived ‘the decline of learning having accompanied that of the Mughal Empire’ and that the ‘Golden age’ of Indian society could be found in ancient texts. Charles Grant echoes this preference for re-informing ‘occident’ from, as he wrote, the ‘disorders, which have become thus inveterate, in the state of society among our Asiatic subjects.’ The acuity that Indian civilization was backward and had been misguided from an earlier period encouraged British policy in India for the re-education of Indian society. In a letter to Earl Cornwallis, Jonathan Duncan discusses the establishment of local proprieties for educating native Indians, and states that a ‘principle advantage that may be derived from this Institution will be felt in its effects, more immediately, by the natives [...] by preserving and disseminating a knowledge of the Hindoo Law.’ It is evident that particular Orientalist approach to educational policy continued in India in the early nineteenth-century as Marquess Wellesley, governor-general from 1797 to 1805, created the College of Fort William. The ‘University of the East’ educated officers in the East India Company about Indian society and re-informed elite Indians who were seeking employment in the Company.

The British elites, directing affairs in India, believed that they were educating Indians in their native way, but the evidence suggests that the Orientalist policy imposed Western education. David Kopf argues that the Orientalists served as avenues, linking the regional elite of Bengal with dynamic civilisation of contemporary Europe. It is evident that even Kopf, writing in the twentieth-century, perceived as preferable a western education based in classical texts. Stuart Schwartz, however, brings attention to ‘the haze of linguistic and cultural
assumptions that limit observation [...] of other cultures [existing] outside the mind of the observer’ and they could only be understood ‘in an admittedly imperfect approximation of a reality.’\textsuperscript{15} British governors in India disseminated Western education as it was the only way they understood how to conduct education.

The ‘Anglicist’ perception of Indian civilization ‘considered that the Hindu population was generally in a backward, immoral and superstitious state.’\textsuperscript{16} This acuity came to play a decisive role in the governance of the East India Company after 1813. In England from 1807 to 1813 a debate took place, as a reaction to the massacre at Vellore, about the future of the British occupancy in India. An outcome of the renewal of the East India Company’s charter in 1813 granted licences to missionaries wishing to evangelize in the Calcutta area. In the forty-third section of the charter, public funds were assigned for educational purposes for ‘the revival and improvement of literature, and the encouragement of the learned natives of India.’\textsuperscript{17} This shows that the dominating perception to re-inform Indian society had shifted and policy would focus more on educating the Indian people in English literature instead of native texts. The tract of a member of the Clapham Evangelicals, Charles Trevelyn, argued that the policy of educating Europeans in the languages and cultures of the East, pursued by the past governor-generals, was mistaken. Lord Macaulay’s ‘Minute on Indian Education’ in 1835, which had great influence on William Bentinck’s Education act of the same year, stated that ‘the dialects commonly spoken among the natives of this part of India [...] are so poor and rude that, until they are enriched from some other quarter, it will not be easy to translate any valuable work into them.’\textsuperscript{18} Macaulay went on to suggest ‘we must do our best to form [...] a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.’\textsuperscript{19} Gauri Viswanathan argued that William Bentinck followed Macaulay’s minute and ‘made English the medium of instruction in Indian education.’\textsuperscript{20}

The perception that the people of India were backward fuelled the belief that Indian society could not modernise until the people were taught the English language and educated in Christian morality. This perception was echoed in Rudyard Kipling’s \textit{Kim}; Father Victor talks to Kim before he is sent off to St. Xavier’s school ‘They’ll make a man o’ you, O’Hara, at St Xavier’s – a white man, an’ I hope, a good man [...] and you’ll remember, when they ask you your religion, that you’re a Cath’lic. Better say Roman Cath’lic. [cis]’\textsuperscript{21} In \textit{Kim}, Kipling directs Father Victor to equate ‘white man’ with ‘good man’ and Father Victor encourages Kim to say he is specifically a ‘Roman’ Catholic. This suggests that at the time anything descended from ancient Rome was seen as superior to that that was not, the East. A writer in the Oriental Herald wrote:

We might insensibly wean their affections from the Persian muse, teach them to despise the barbarous splendour of their ancient princes, and, totally supplanting the tastes which flourished under the which the youthful student feels for the classical soil of Greece.’\textsuperscript{22}
This illustrates how the ‘Anglicist’ ideology influence the perception, held by the British elites in the East India Company, of the people of Indian re-directed British educational policy in India.

The uprising of 1857 encouraged a change in British colonial perceptions and the subsequent redirection of educational policy. Some people amongst the British elite governing India, which was now the British government, believed that they may not have ‘known’ Indian civilization after all. George Trevelyan said ‘we have certainly not got to the bottom of the native character.’

Before the uprising John Kaye wrote about ‘thuggee’: ‘in time we began to understand these things. We ordained a clue and we followed it up, until the hideous mystery was brought out into the clear light of day.’ The uprising encouraged a new era of policy directed at the education of the ‘native’ Indians in order to retain British security. The British position in India had been threatened – whether that was the intention behind the Indian activities or not – and British control needed to be reaffirmed.

Up until 1857 there was a certain degree of reliance on English-educated Indians in the Civil service, however, policy altered in 1858 to remove educated Indian people from positions of responsibility. Thomas Metcalf suggests that ‘the Government was well aware of the frustration and resentment which this exclusion produced in the heart of the educated Indian and the experience of the Mutiny had taught the British, if nothing else, the discontented and unhappy men were a fertile breeding ground for sedition. Queen Victoria’s proclamation of 1858, encouraged the equal participation of Indians in the civil service. Although it was still possible for a native Indian to join the Indian Civil service, exams had to be taken in London, a candidate had to gather £100 for his fare and living costs, and the likelihood of him doing well depended on him being educated at a British institution which would cost over £2,000; a sum beyond the reach of 99 per cent of Indian families. The perception that educated Indians posed a threat to British security in India informed colonial educational policy by forcibly redirecting civil service examinations to London and removing people, native to India, from positions of responsibility.

British administrators in India believed that there was a religious element to the uprising and therefore education policy needed to be re-directed under ‘secular’ lines. Queen Victoria’s proclamation solemnly prohibited ‘all interference with religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure’. It appears that the Queen perceived the uprising to have been aggravated by religious motivations and that this threatened British power in India. As a sign of British government’s readiness to avoid interfering in the social and religious affairs of the Indian people, the governance of Indian after the uprising, under the leadership of the Viceroy Lord Canning, took measures against Christian missionaries in order to forbid their activities in India; however, evidence suggests that missionary work continued.

The work of the Hunter Commission showed:
The cost of directly funded public education across all sectors and provinces was in 1882 Rs 297 per pupil; whereas state aid to missionary and other privately run institutions was achieving the same result for less than Rs 36 per head - a vast saving. 29

It is hence questionable as to whether education was re-directed under secular lines; however, the uprising of 1857 had shocked the British government to claim it was no longer following a policy to convert people in India to Christianity. This shows that perceptions towards Indian society encouraged the British government to reconsider how it educated the people of Indian and perhaps a greater subtlety was needed in order to continue Western education.

The actions of Allan Hume suggest that British perceptions of Indian society splintered after the uprising of 1857 and he believed that the Indian people had been sufficiently educated and were now ready to govern themselves. In his address to the graduates of Calcutta in 1883 he said ‘whether in the individual or the nation, all vital progress must spring from within, and it is to you, her most cultured and enlightened minds’ he said should free the nation. 30 Even Hume, who appeared to be vindicating an overthrow of British colonial rule, only believed this can be done now because Indians had finally been sufficiently educated in a Western style. Hume warned the British government that it could not ‘assert its supremacy as it may at the bayonet’s point, a free and civilized government must look for its stability and permanence to the enlightenment of the people, and their moral and intellectual capacity to appreciate its blessings.’ 31 This implies that even though Hume encouraged nationalist action to be taken by the India educated elite and created the Indian National Council in 1882 for this purpose, he still believed that Western education enabled some Indian people to become civilized.

Orientalist thought shaped ideas people held of Indian society in the early nineteenth-century and this impression pursued governor-generals undertake the policy to ‘know’ India. The perception that gained greater influence, after the ‘massacre’ at Vellore, was that Indian civilization was immoral and backward. ‘Anglicist’ philosophy dominated British administration and educational policy altered towards ‘moralizing’ the people of India. The uprising of 1857 marked a change of administration as the uprising encouraged an alteration of perceptions of Indian society. The British government re-directed educational policy to try supressing what they believed was discontentment towards the British rule in India. An alternate perception, which splinted from dominant perception within the British government, was the idea that Indian elites were educated and this persuaded Allan Hume to encourage Indian elites to administer their own affairs in India. Surendranath Banerjea, who founded the Indian Nationalist Association, argued that, cut off from Britain, Indians would be left ‘unfed, unsupported by the culture, the art and civilization of the rest of mankind, rejoicing in our isolation, taking pride in our aloofness. To me the thought is intolerable.’ 32 The unwavering concept, throughout
the nineteenth-century was that Western civilization was superior to Eastern society and therefore Indian culture should be re-informed through Western education. Further research, into various nationalist narratives, would be beneficial in determining the extent to which Indian society had been moulded by the educational policy of the nineteenth-century and whether there was any original policy towards a distinctive Eastern way of acquiring knowledge.

Notes

3. Charles Wilkins, 'Preface', in *Glossary to the Fifth Report from the Select Committee in the Last Session of Parliament*, (East India House, 1813), p. IV.
6. Ibid., p. 18.

31. Ibid., p. 19.


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